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MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
A father, either presumptive or putative, must have an opportunity to
litigate the paternity of a child whom he is compelled to support. Any
proceeding that establishes paternity, to be res judicata, must be predicated
on personal service.
JEAN E. GosTEmiN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: STATUTORILY REQUIRED
MEDIATION AS A PRECONDITION TO LAWSUIT
DENIES ACCESS TO THE COURTS
State ex rel. Cardinal Glennon Memorial Hospital v. Gaertner'
Cardinal Glennon Memorial Hospital for Children was sued as one of
several defendants to a medical malpractice claim. It filed a motion to dis-
miss2 on the ground that the plaintiffs had failed to comply with Mo. Rev.
Stat. chapter 538 which required that all such malpractice claims against
within their respective jurisdictions shall have power to declare rights, status, and
other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed ....
The usual plaintiffs are the child and his mother as next friend. The action
also may be brought by a person who alleges he is the father of a child
even if the mother disagrees. See David v. Cindy, 565 S.W.2d 803 (Mo. App., D.
Spr. 1978), in which custody of the illegitimate child was awarded to the putative
father after he had brought a declaratory judgment action to establish himself
as the natural father. It is interesting to note that the child was not joined. Pre-
sumably, at a later date, the child could challenge the paternity findings. See notes
35 & 36 and accompanying text supra.
The standard of proof required to establish paternity of an illegitimate child
is preponderance of the evidence. Much deference is given to the trial court's op-
portunity to judge credibility. This is important since the only evidence may be an
accusation and a denial. In T.A.L.S. v. R.D.B., 539 S.W.2d 737 (Mo. App., D. St.
L. 1976), the mother stated that the defendant was the father of her child and that
she had not had intercourse with anyone else. In addition, the child was present
during the trial for comparison of features. The verdict for the mother was
upheld. In S_J_-B_ v. S__FS_ , 504 S.W.2d 233 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1973),
there was conflicting testimony by the mother and the putative father. -judgment
was upheld for the defendant father because of the trial court's opportunity to judge
the credibility of the witnesses.
In addition to liability for support of the child, the putative father also has
been held liable for the child's and mother's attorneys' fees. The court in Stege-
mann v. Fauk, 571 S.W.2d 697 (Mo. App., D. St. 1.- 1978), found its authority in
RSMo § 452.355 (1978) and in its power to exercise equitable jurisdiction to care
and provide for minor children.
1. 583 S.W.2d 107 (Mo. En Banc 1979).
2. See Mo. R. Civ. P. 55.27.
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RECENT CASES
health care providers be submitted to a Professional Liability Review
Board3 prior to the filing of a petition in court. The trial court found
the statute to be unconstitutional and overruled the motion to dismiss.
The Missouri Supreme Court, on the hospital's petition, issued a pro-
visional rule in prohibition and a show cause order against the circuit
judge.4 This rule was later quashed when the court found chapter 538 to
be unconstitutionaL5
The court held that the requirements of chapter 538 violated article I,
section 14 of the Missouri Constitution by denying access to the courts to
plaintiffs. 6 Article I, section 14, provides that "the courts of justice shall
be open to every person, and certain remedy afforded for every injury to
person, property or character, and that right and justice shall be adminis-
tered without sale, denial or delay." Chapter 538, which became effective
January 1, 1977, established a prerequisite to the filing of a medical mal-
practice lawsuit: a review board, composed of a circuit judge,7 two attorneys,
two health care providers, and one layperson,8 must hear evidence on the
claim and make recommendations as to liability and damages. 9 These rec-
ommendations were not binding on any of the parties, 10 and were not ad-
missible at any subsequent trial of the lawsuit."1 The parties retained the
express right to reject the recommendations and to file a petition in court, 12
and were limited in such right only by the statute of limitations applicable
to the tort.'3 The maximum time allowed between the plaintiff's initia-
tion of the cause with the Board and the issuance of recommendations was
150 days.' 4
The Gaertner court's principal authority for its decision was People
ex rel. Christiansen v. Connell.'5 In that case, the Illinois Supreme Court
struck down a statute which required the filing of notice with the circuit
court sixty days prior to filing a petition for divorce.' 6 That sixty day delay
was found to deny access to the courts in violation of a provision of the
3. See notes 7-14 and accompanying text infra.
4. 583 S.W.2d at 108.
5. Id. at 111.
6. Id. at 110.
7. The presence of a circuit judge on the panel created a separation of
powers problem. Id. at 111-12 (Simeone, J., concurring). See also notes 63-68 and
accompanying text infra.
8. RSMo § 538.025 (1978).
9. RSMo § 588.045 (1978).
10. RSMo § 588.050 (1978).
11. Id.
12. Id.
18. RSMo § 538.020 (2) (1978). The limitation period for medical malprac-
tice actions is two years. RSMo § 516.105 (1978).
14. RSMo §§ 538.035 (1), .045 (1978). The hearing was required to be con-
cluded within 90 days of filing with the Board. The Board then had 80 days
to issue its recommendations with an extension of 30 days available if needed.
15. 2 Ill. 2d 332, 118 N.E.2d 262 (1954).
16. 1958 Ill. Laws at 284.
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Illinois Constitution1" which closely resembled article I, section 14 of the
Missouri Constitution.
The Gaertner court distinguished Comiskey v. Arlen,18 a 1976 New
York Supreme Court case which dismissed a denial of access to the courts
challenge to a statute similar to Missouri's chapter 538, on the ground that
the New York statute19 provided for the review panel to convene after
the filing of a petition. This distinction, combined with the subsequent
legislation and case law in Illinois, 20 indicates a dissatisfaction by the Mis-
souri Supreme Court with the requirement that the review board's hearing
had to occur prior to filing of the petition and, more importantly, prior
to acquisition of personal jurisdiction over the defendant. 21
A strong dissent by Chief Justice Morgan in Gaertner22 points out
the presence of a substantial body of recent case law at the federal and
state levels dealing with access to the courts in general and with medical
malpractice review boards in particular.2 3 He would have upheld the
constitutionality of chapter 538, a view consistent with that adopted by
the majority of jurisdictions which have decided this issue.
17. ILL. CONST. Of 1870, art. II, § 19 (current version at ILL. CONST. art. I, §
12) provided:
Every person ought to find a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries
and wrongs which he may receive in his person, property or reputation;
he ought to obtain, by law, right and justice freely, and without being
obliged to purchase it, completely and without denial, promptly and
without delay.
18. 55 A.D.2d 304, 390 N.Y.S.2d 122 (1976).
19. N.Y. JuD. LAW § 148-a (1) (McKinney Supp. 1979).
20. After Christiansen was decided, the Illinois legislature amended the
statute so that the 60-day delay came after the filing of a praecipe for summons
which, when served on the defendant, gave the court personal jurisdiction over
him. The Illinois Supreme Court found this amendment (1955 Il. Laws at 2114)
to be satisfactory and upheld the new statute. People ex rel. Doty v. Connell, 9
Ill. 2d 390, 137 N.E.2d 849 (1956).
21. Logic dictates that immediate acquisition of jurisdiction over the de-
fendant will be far more crucial to the plaintiff and to the court when the de-
fendant is an estranged spouse than when the defendant is a hospital or a prac-
ticing physician. The relative dangers of a defendant eluding service of process
are obvious. Despite this distinction, the Gaertner majority appears to have viewed
this delay in service of process as significant.
22. 583 S.W.2d at 112.
23. See, e.g., Hines v. Elkhart Gen. Hosp., 465 F. Supp. 421 (N.D. Ind.
1979); Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 570 P.2d 744 (1977); Carter v. Spark-
man, 335 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 1976); Wright v. Central DuPage Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill.
2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976); Everett v. Goldman, 359 So. 2d 1256 (La. 1978);
Attorney Gen. v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 385 A.2d 57 (1978); Paro v. Longwood
Hosp., 369 N.E.2d 985 (Mass. 1977); Prendergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 256
N.W.2d 657 (1977); Comiskey v. Arlen, 55 A.D.2d 304, 390 N.Y.S.2d 122 (1976);
Parker v. Children's Hosp., 483 Pa. 106, 394 A.2d 932 (1978); State ex rel. Stry-
kowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491, 261 N.W.2d 434 (1977). See also Jones v. State
Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976) (discussion of access to the
courts question, but holding did not rest on that ground); Simon v. St. Elizabeth
Medical Center, 3 Ohio Op. 3d 164, 355 N.E.2d 903 (Ct. Common Pleas 1976).
[Vol. 45
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Most state constitutions contain a clause similar or identical to that
of Missouri's article I, section 14.24 Those jurisdictions for the most part
have developed case law which interprets and construes those sections in a
haphazard and non-definitive fashion.2 5 In recent years, though, there has
been a movement toward adoption of statutes which establish a pre-litiga-
tion process similar to Missouri's chapter 538.26 As those statutes have been
subjected to judicial scrutiny under these constitutional provisions, the
courts have begun to employ standard constitutional tests. Most frequently,
the level of protection which the courts will afford the constitutional pro-
vision depends on the nature of the substantive right being asserted in the
underlying claim. If the substantive right is deemed to be "fundamental,"
statutory restrictions will be examined very closely under the strict scrutiny
test; 27 only the presence of a compelling state interest will justify the re-
striction or denial of access to the courts. If, on the other hand, the sub-
stantive right being asserted is not the subject of a specific constitutional
24. See, e.g., Aiuz. CoNsT. art. II, § 11; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21; ILL. CONsT. art.
1, § 12; IND. CONST. art. I, § 12; LA. CONST. art. 1, § 22; MD. CONsT. Declaration of
Rights, art 19; MAss. CONST. pt. I, art. 11; MINN. CONsr. art. I, § 8; NEB. CONST.
art. I, § 13; OHIO CONST. art. 1, § 16; PA. CONsT. art. I, § 11; UTAH CONST. art. I, §
11; WIS. CONST. art. I, § 9.
25. See, e.g., Welch v. Davis, 342 I11. App. 69, 95 N.E.2d 108 (1950),
rev'd on other grounds, 410 I1. 130, 101 N.E.2d 547 (1952); Pullen v. Novak, 169
Neb. 211, 99 N.W.2d 16 (1959). See generally annotated constitutional sections,
supra note 24, and cases compiled thereunder.
The Missouri Supreme Court has not enunciated any consistent rules of law
in its interpretation of Mo. CONsT. art. I, § 14, although a variety of fact situations
have been found to deny or not to deny access to the courts. See, e.g., Glenn v.
Department of Corrections, 434 S.W.2d 473 (Mo. 1968) (sovereign immunity up-
held); State v. Aubuchon, 381 S.W.2d 807 (Mo. 1964) (reasonable court costs
and fees upheld); Kreuger v. Schmiechen, 364 Mo. 568, 264 S.W.2d 311 (1954)
(charitable immunity upheld); State ex rel. National Ref. Co. v. Seehorn, 344 Mo.
547, 127 S.W.2d 418 (1939) (common law rule that damages in tort do not sur-
vive death of wronged or wrongdoer upheld); State ex rel. Kennedy v. Remmers,
340 Mo. 126, 101 S.W.2d 70 (1937) (municipal administrative rule requiring po-
licemen to obtain permission before retaining legal counsel and filing civil action
struck down); DeMay v. Liberty Foundry Co., 327 Mo. 495, 37 S.W.2d 640 (1931)
(workmen's compensation statute upheld). But see Kyger v. Koerper, 355 Mo.
772, 207 S.W.2d 46 (1948); Kristanik v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 335 Mo. 60, 68,
70 S.W.2d 890, 894 (1934) (legislature could not impose a delay upon the adminis-
tration of justice which was "unreasonable" and "unnecessary"). These terms ap-
pear to be used purely in a descriptive fashion, however, and not to delineate
any precise standards of analysis.
26. See, e.g., Ax. STAT. ANN. § 34-2602 (Supp. 1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
768.44 (West Supp. 1979); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-9.5-9-1 to -10 (Burns Supp. 1979);
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.47 (West 1977); N.Y. JUD. LAWS § 148-a (McKinney
Supp. 1979-80); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 1301.301-.606 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80);
Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 655.02-.21 (West Supp. 1979).
27. Cf. Parker v. Children's Hosp., 483 Pa. 106, 120-21, 394 A.2d 932, 939-40
(1978) (Pennsylvania court does not declare the right to be a fundamental one, but
nevertheless rejects the claim on the ground of a compelling state interest). It is
not dear whether this court considers the strict scrutiny test to be necessary and
appropriate or if it merely describes the supporting interest as compelling in
order to summarily dispense with the issue.
1980]
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protection and is therefore not fundamental, 28 then the rational basis test
provides that access to the courts may be restricted if a rational or reason-
able basis for the restriction is shown.2 9
The Washington Supreme Court took a different approach in Carter
v. University of Washington30 and held that the presence of a specific con-
stitutional provision guaranteeing access to the courts made that right of
access itself fundamental. Thus, the right of access was subject to the strict
scrutiny test regardless of the substantive right being asserted.31 This posi-
tion is distinctly in the minority but is nonetheless well-reasoned. The equal
protection and due process clauses of the Federal 2 and Washington Con-
stitutions83 were construed to mean that only a compelling state interest
will justify a denial of equal protection or due process when the substan-
tive right being asserted is fundamental. Among fundamental rights are
those specifically guaranteed by the terms of the constitution. When access
to the courts is so guaranteed, the Washington court reasoned, it is a
fundamental right and any attempted restriction will be subjected to
strict scrutiny.8 4 While the logic of this argument is convincing, it has not
been expressly adopted by any other jurisdiction.35
28. A few rights have been deemed fundamental though they are not spe-
cifically guaranteed in the language of the Constitution. See, e.g., Boddie v. Con-
necticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (right to divorce); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618 (1969) (right to travel); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right to
privacy).
29. See Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So. 2d 802, 805-06 (Fla. 1976); Everett v.
Goldman, 359 So. 2d 1256, 1268-69 (La. 1978). The Carter court admitted that
"the pre-litigation burden cast upon the claimant reaches the outer limits of
constitutional tolerance." 335 So. 2d at 806. Cf. State v. Massey, 275 N.W.2d 436
(Iowa 1979) (applied the rational basis test to an access to the courts question,
which did not involve a constitutional provision similar to that in Mo. CONST. art.
I, § 14). See also Jenkins v. Washington, 85 Wash. 2d 883, 540 P.2d 1363 (1975).
30. 85 Wash. 2d 391, 536 P.2d 618 (1975).
31. Id. at 398-99, 536 P.2d at 623. The Carter court found the right of access
to the courts to be inherent in the constitutional provision preserving the right
to petition for grievances. WASH. CONsT. art. 1, § 4. The court made no mention
of WAsH. CoNsT. art. I, § 10, which declares that "justice in all cases shall be
administered openly and without unnecessary delay." This clause seems to pro-
vide a much stronger case for the fundamental nature of the right than does the
"petition for grievances" clause.
32. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.
33. WASH. CONsT. art. I, §§ 3 & 12.
34. Carter was overruled in Housing Auth. v. Saylors, 87 Wash. 2d 732, 557
P.2d 321 (1977). The Saylors court held that the "petition for grievances" clause
of the Washington Constitution, see note 31 supra, did not create a right of
access to the courts, and that the right was therefore not fundamental. 87 Wash.
2d at 742, 557 P.2d at 327. Once again, the court ignored the constitutional pro-
vision similar to that in Mo. CONsT. art. I, § 14, which strongly supports the argu-
ment as to the fundamental nature of the right. It is important to note that the
Saylors court did not hold that access to the courts could not be fundamental, only
that the "petition for grievances" clause did not make it fundamental. 87
Wash. 2d at 742, 557 P.2d at 327.
35. There is at least one good reason why courts have been reluctant to
declare access to the courts to be a fundamental right in and of itself. Such a hold-
ing could make vulnerable some well-established judicial and legislative corner-
[Vol. 45
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In ruling that the right of access to the courts is not a fundamental
right, the majority of state courts have relied on authority stemming from
the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has held in civil
cases that the rational basis test is to be applied unless the underlying
substantive right being asserted is fundamental. 36 Although the status of
the right of access to the courts is less clear in the area of criminal law, s3 7
the question seems reasonably well-settled as it pertains to the civil law.
While most state constitutions specifically guarantee the right of access to
the courts,38 the United States Constitution does not. 39 Thus, the Carter
argument that access to the courts is a fundamental right in and of itself
is not as readily available to the United States Supreme Court.40
stones to actions based on a theory of access to the courts. Those areas could in-
dude, for example: statutes of limitations, Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 Ill. 2d
418, 261 N.E.2d 305 (1970); Forest v. Pa-malee, 402 Mich. 348, 262 N.W.2d 653
(1978); the requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies, West Penn.
Power Co. v. Train, 522 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1975); requirements of court costs and
filing fees, Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973); United States v. Kras, 409
U.S. 434 (1973); and agencies of so-called "primary jurisdiction," e.g., the Mis-
souri Public Service Commission, see generally Davis, The Missouri Public Service
Commission, 42 U.M.K.C. L. REv. 279 (1974). While it is far from certain that
any of these would fail that test, it is quite possible that the courts prefer a case-
by-case analysis of the Gaertner variety to such a potentially painful and far-reach-
ing judicial reconsideration.
36. Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973); United States v. Kras, 409 U.S.
434 (1973); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
37. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977), in which the Court held that
"the fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison au-
thorities" to provide inmates with either adequate law libraries or trained legal
counsel to assist in the preparation and filing of legal papers. Id. at 828. Al-
though the word "fundamental" is used here to describe the right of access to
the courts, no express mention is made of strict scrutiny or compelling state in-
terest. It seems possible, then, that the Court intended the term "fundamental"
merely to describe the right in this particular context and not to convey a
constitutional status. Mr. Justice Rehnquist noted in his vigorous dissent that
the right of access to the courts is found nowhere in the Constitution. Id. at 839.
Of course, that does not mean that it cannot be a fundamental right. See note
28 supra.
38. See note 24 supra.
39. Although not explicitly guaranteed by the terms of the United States
Constitution, equality of access to the courts has long been protected under the
fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Barbier v. Connally, 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1885),
where the Court declared that the fourteenth amendment intended that all per-
sons "should have like access to the courts of the country for the protection of
their persons and property."
40. The anomaly presented by all this is that the United States Supreme
Court decisions, see note 36 supra, are the principal authority used by many of
the state courts in their determination that the rational basis test applies. Those
federal cases, however, are based in part on the fact that the United States Con-
stitution does not contain a specific guarantee of access to the courts. Without that
guarantee, it is much easier to find the right not to be fundamental. Unquestioned
reliance on that authority by a state court would seem unjustified when the state
constitution specifically guarantees access to the courts. Consideration should be
given to the possibility that the state constitution makes the right fundamental.
Only the Washington court, however, has made such an examination. See notes
30-35 and accompanying text supra.
1980]
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Assuming that access to the courts is not inherently a fundamental
right, an evaluation must be made of the underlying substantive claim be-
ing asserted in the malpractice review board cases: the tort action for
medical negligence. Since that claim does not encompass a fundamental
right,41 the statutes are subjected to the rational basis test. When that test
has been applied, the statutes have been upheld.
The Gaertner court apparently did not apply the rational basis test
since chapter 538 easily would have passed the constitutional demands of
that test. As the dissent noted, a medical malpractice crisis has arisen in
this state as well as in the nation.42 The plethora of large malpractice
verdicts has caused malpractice insurance premiums to increase dra-
matically. Those increases have been passed on to the general public in
the form of rapidly increasing patient costs. This skyrocketing cost of health
care, coupled with extensive publicity giving rise to public awareness of
medical negligence, may have caused in some sectors of the public a de-
cline in trust and confidence in the medical profession. Chapter 538 might
have been a legislative attempt to alleviate this problem and could be
justified on the rational basis that it was reasonably well-calculated to
have a positive impact on it. Frivolous claims would be discouraged, while
the settlement of meritorious claims would be encouraged.
In failing to apply the rational basis test, the Gaertner court either
ignored or rejected without comment a significant group of cases from
the supreme courts of other states which did apply that test to virtually
identical situations.43 Typical of those cases is Attorney General v. John-
son,44 where the Maryland Supreme Court rejected an access to the courts
claim which was based on a constitutional clause similar to Missouri's
article I, section 14. 4 5 The Maryland statute challenged in Johnson was
far more restrictive of the parties' rights than was Mo. Rev. Stat. chapter
538. It required that both notice of rejection of the panel's findings and
an action to nullify those findings be filed in the circuit court within
ninety days of the panel's decision. Failure to timely file would cause the
findings to become final at that time and subject to entry into judgment.46
Furthermore, the findings were admissible into evidence and presumed to
41. Everett v. Goldman, 359 So. 2d 1256, 1266 (La. 1978).
42. See generally AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, MALPRACTICE IN Focus
12-13 (1975); LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE: A SURVEY OF ASSOCIATED PROBLEMS AND PROPOSED REMEDIES 7-8
(1975); DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, REPORT OF THE SECRE-
TARY'S COMdMISSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 5-10 (1973), cited in Comment,
The Constitutional Considerations of Medical Malpractice Screening Panels, 27
Am. U.L. REv. 161 n.2 (1977). See also Mechanic, Some Social Aspects of the Medi-
cal Malpractice Dilemma, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1179; Redish, Legislative Response to
the Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis: Constitutional Implications, 55 TEx.
L. REV. 759 (1977).
43. See notes 44-56 and accompanying text infra.
44. 282 Md. 274, 385 A.2d 57 (1978).
45. MD. CONST. Declaration of Rights, art. 19.
46. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-06 (a), (b) (Supp. 1978).
[Vol. 45
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be correct. The party rejecting them had the burden of proving them
wrong.47 The Maryland court held that the terms of this statute did not
violate the right of access to the courts. The right was admittedly restricted,
but as long as the restrictions were "reasonable," they were not consti-
tutionally offensive.4 8
The supreme courts of Florida,49 Louisiana, 50 and Wisconsin51 also
have applied the rational basis test to their respective state constitutions
and statutes, and have concluded that malpractice mediation panels iden-
tical to or more restrictive than Missouri's 52 did not deny access to the
courts. 53 All of those states have constitutional provisions similar to Mis-
souri's article I, section 14. 5 4 All have statutes which require mediation of
medical malpractice claims prior to the filing of a lawsuit5 5 and which al-
low admission of the panel's findings into evidence. 56 Yet all of them
rejected the claim that the statute denied access to the courts.
The Missouri Supreme Court has taken a conspicuous minority posi-
tion on this point. Despite the nearly unanimous authority of other state
courts, the rational basis test will not be the standard in Missouri for evalu-
ating the assertion that the right of access to the courts has been violated
by mandatory pre-litigation arbitration of claims involving non-funda-
mental rights. It is unclear what standard, if any, will be applied, but it
apparently will not be the rational basis test.
The Gaertner decision effectively has thrown the medical malpractice
crisis back into the laps of the Missouri legislature. The need for some
kind of pre-litigation screening process is once again of paramount con-
cern. In order to withstand judicial scrutiny, however, the designers of new
legislation must provide for certain basic rights of the parties. More than
just the resolution of the medical malpractice crisis is at stake. The state's
interest must be brought into better balance with and, if necessary, sub-
ordinated to, the interests of the parties.
One change which appears to be essential is that the panel convene
47. Id. § 3-2A-06 (d).
48. 282 Md. 274, 299-300, 385 A.2d 57, 72 (1978).
49. Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 1976).
50. Everett v. Goldman, 359 So. 2d 1256 (La. 1978).
51. State ex rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491, 261 N.V.2d 434 (1978).
52. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.47 (West Supp. 1979), allows the panel's
conclusions to be introduced into evidence at a subsequent trial, but forbids the
admission of specific findings of fact; LA. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.47 (West
Supp. 1979), makes the panel's findings admissible and also allows the panel
members to be called as witnesses.
53. Hines v. Elkhart Gen. Hosp., 465 F. Supp. 421 (N.D. Ind. 1979), was de-
cided approximately one month before Gaertner, and therefore was not cited or
relied upon by the Missouri Supreme Court. Nevertheless, its facts cannot be dis-
tinguished from the facts of Gaertner.
54. See note 24 supra.
55. Fr.. STAT. ANN. § 768.44 (1) (a) (West Supp. 1979); LA. Rxv. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:1299.47 (B) (West 1977); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 655.04 (1) (b) (West Supp. 1979).
56. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.47 (2) (West Supp. 1979); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
40.1299.47 (H) (West Supp. 1979); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 655.19 (1) (West Supp. 1979).
1980]
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after the filing of plaintiff's petition and service of process on defendant.57
The mediation procedure would no longer be a prerequisite to actual
entry into the judicial process, but merely another procedural step within
that process. The threshold delay in access to the courts would be removed.
This change also would help lessen the possibility that the plaintiff would
be unable to acquire personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Another of
the principal dangers of chapter 538 would thereby vanish.
Facilitation of discovery, though mentioned only briefly by the con-
currence in Gaertner,8 is a modification which would further serve to
shield the parties from prejudice and the statute from constitutional at-
tack. Chapter 538's sole discovery provision authorized the panel to sub-
poena documents, records, or other evidence; 59 no provision was included
for the parties to initiate any process of discovery. 60 The right to dis-
covery is essential to a party's development of his case.6 1 Postponement of
the availability of discovery, such as was possible under the procedures of
chapter 538, in some cases could vitiate the capacity to defend or prosecute:
witnesses could die or disappear;6 2 memories could grow dim. New legisla-
tion preserving these discovery rights would prevent these hypotheticals
from becoming a reality.
Several other potential weaknesses of chapter 538-type legislation war-
rant mentioning. Most important is that noted in the concurring opinion:
separation of powers.03 The Missouri Constitution mandates separation of
the powers of the executive, judicial, and legislative branches of the state
government. 4 By imposing non-judicial functions on judicial personnel,
or by imposing judicial functions on non-judicial personnel, chapter 538
may have violated that provision. The argument is that the circuit judge
who chaired the review board was compelled to exercise executive or ad-
ministrative functions,65 and that the non-judicial members of the review
57. See notes 18-21 and accompanying text supra.
58. 583 S.W.2d at 112.
59. RSMo § 538.035 (2) (1978).
60. See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37; Mo. R. Civ. P. 56-61 (discovery pro-
visions).
61. See generally 4, 4A J. MooR., MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE (Supp. 1978-79);
C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THr LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS §§ 81-90 (3d ed. 1976);
C. WIUGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 2001-2300 (Supp.
1978); Frost, The Ascertainment of Truth by Discovery, 28 F.R.D. 37, 89-97
(1960); Wright, Wegner & Richardson, The Practicing Attorney's View of the
Utility of Discovery, 12 F.R.D. 97 (1952).
62. See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 27; Mo. R. Civ. P. 57.02 (depositions to
perpetuate testimony).
63. 583 S.W.2d at 111-12.
64. Mo. CONsT. art. IL § 1.
65. This appears to be the principal concern of the concurring opinion. 583
S.W.2d at 111 (Simeone, J., concurring). But see Schwab v. St. Louis, 310 Mo.
116, 274 S.W. 1058 (1925). The Schwab court said that non-judicial duties may
be performed by judicial officers unless the Missouri Constitution itself clearly
delegates those duties to the executive or legislative branches. See also Parsons
v. Harvey, 281 Mo. 413, 221 S.W. 21 (1920); State ex rel. Manning v. Higgins,
125 Mo. 364, 28 S.W. 638 (1894).
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board were empowered to exercise judicial functions.66 If a majority of the
court is willing to accept this argument, the survival of any future legisla-
tion remains doubtful. The functions of the review board are either judicial
or non-judicial. In either case an attack could be mounted. It is, however,
significant that this separation of powers argument has met with success
only once when used to attack a medical malpractice mediation statute.
6 7
Its failures are far more numerous. 68
A trio of other constitutional claims can and probably will be directed
at any future legislation. Due process, 69 equal protection,70 and trial by
jury71 claims have been presented to every appellate court which has been
called upon to pass judgment on a medical malpractice mediation statute7 2
Trial by jury has been successful once."3 Due process and equal protec-
tion have been unanimously rejected, 74 as had been access to the courts
prior to Gaertner75 The possibility that the Missouri Supreme Court would
accept a previously unaccepted basis of attack therefore cannot be ruled
out, although success on one of these theories seems unlikely. Chapter 538
was far less restrictive of and prejudicial to the rights of due process, equal
protection, and trial by jury than were any of the approximately twelve
statutes subjected to judicial evaluation in other states."6 Unless future
legislation in some way more seriously threatens these rights, it is im-
probable that an attack on these grounds would succeed.
The Gaertner decision ultimately does not give the legislature or the
66. In Wright v. Central DuPage Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d
736 (1976), the Illinois Supreme Court struck down a statute similar to RSMo
ch. 538 on the ground that it empowered non-judicial members of the panel to
exercise judicial functions. These two lines of attack could be made alternatively,
depending on whether the functions of the board were found to be judicial or
non-judicial. If the functions of the board were found to include both types,
then the two theories could be presented concurrently.
67. Wright v. Central DuPage Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d
736 (1976).
68. See, e.g., Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 582, 570 P.2d 744, 750
(1977); Paro v. Longwood Hosp., 369 N.E.2d 985, 991-92 (Mass. 1977).
69. See, e.g., Everett v. Goldman, 359 So. 2d 1256, 1267-68 (La. 1978).
70. See, e.g., Hines v. Elkhart Gen. Hosp., 465 F. Supp. 421, 430-31 (N.D.
Ind. 1979).
71. See, e.g., Parker v. Children's Hosp., 483 Pa. 106, 124-26, 394 A.2d 932,
941-42 (1978).
72. See cases cited note 23 supra.
73. Wright v. Central DuPage Hosp. Ass'n, 63 I11. 2d 313, 321-24, 347 N.E.2d
736, 740-41 (1976).
74. See, e.g., cases cited in notes 69 & 70 supra.
75. See notes 44-56 and accompanying text supra.
76. AIz. Rxv. STAr. § 12-567 (West Supp. 1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.44
(West Supp. 1979); IDAHO Sass. LAWs ch. 278, at 953 (1976); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
110, §§ 58.3-.10 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-9.5-9-1 to -10
(BuMs Supp. 1979); LA. Rxv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.47 (West Supp. 1979); MD.
CTs. & JuD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 3-2A-01 to -09 (Supp. 1978); MAss. GEN. LAws
ANN. ch. 231, § 60B (West Supp. 1979); NEB. Rrv. STAT. §§ 44-2801 to -2855 (1978);
N.Y. JUn. LAWS § 148-a (McKinney Supp. 1979-80); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§
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